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Abstract
Classical models of money are typically based on a competitive market without
capital or credit. ey then impose exogenous timing structures, market participa-
tion constraints, or cash-in-advance constraints to make money essential. We present
a simplemodel without credit wheremoney arises from a fixed cost of production.is
leads to a rich equilibrium structure. Agents avoid the fixed cost by taking vacations
and the trade between workers and vacationers is supported by money. We show that
agents acquire and spend money in cycles of finite length. roughout such a “money
cycle,” agents decrease their consumption which we interpret as the hot potato effect of
inflation. We give an example where money holdings do not decrease monotonically
throughout the money cycle. Optimal monetary policy is given by the Friedman rule,
which supports efficient equilibria. us, monetary policy provides an alternative to
lotteries for smoothing out non-convexities.
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
 Introduction
Classical models of money are typically based on a competitive market without capital or
credit.ey then impose exogenous timing structures, market participation constraints, or
cash-in-advance constraints to give agents a reason to trade and hence make money es-
sential. In the overlapping generations framework of Samuelson (), only the young
generation may produce and therefore money supports trade between the old and young
generations.emodel of spatially separatedmarkets of Townsend () uses a particular
timing structure where each agent alternates between being a buyer and a seller depending
on the stock of endowment. Bewley () uses stochastic endowment shocks and money
supports trade between those agents with good and bad shocks. Market participation con-
straints are used by Wicksell () to guarantee that agents use money to trade in cir-
cles. Kiyotaki and Wright () elaborate on Wicksell’s approach by replacing the market
participation constraints by pairwise random matching. Money then resolves the arising
double coincidence of wants problem.
We present a novel reason for fiat money to be essential: a fixed cost of engaging in pro-
duction in each time period. For example, workers must pay a fixed transport cost before
beginning productive activities. Restaurants must prepare fresh ingredients every day they
wish to open. Airline pilots must pass security checks before flying. When fixed costs are
high, agents do not work every day, and money supports trade between vacationers and
workers. is friction gives rise to a rich equilibrium structure. To finance consumption
during vacations, agents save by selling surplus production and accumulating money. In
order to study the effects of monetary policy, we allow the money stock to change at a con-
stant rate by lump sum transfers. We show that if the money stock expands at a rate above
the Friedman rule, then agents’ money holdings, consumption and production decisions
proceed through repeating money cycles of finite length. An agent begins his money cycle
with no money, works during the first period and takes a vacation during the final period.
Note that money cycles are not attributable to any kind of exogenous shocks or changes
in the policy. ere is no uncertainty in the model and the monetary policy is stationary.
Figure  shows an example of a simple money cycle. Money cycles possess several striking
features, which we discuss in turn.
Decreasing consumption At the Friedman rule, equilibria are efficient and agents have
constant consumption. However, away from the Friedman rule, agents decrease their con-
sumption over the length of themoney cycle.is distortion arises because the inflation tax
of holding money adds a wedge between the marginal cost and marginal return of saving.
We interpret it as the hot potato effect of inflation, because inflation causes agents to trade
prematurely. us, money is not super-neutral in the money cycles model.
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Figure : A simple money cycle. e symbols q, z and x denote production, real balances
of money holdings, and consumption respectively.
A similar effect arises in Samuelson () where consumption decreases over the life-
cycle of an agent if the interest rate is away from zero. In Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(), a money model based on the Lagos andWright () search and matching frame-
work, the exogenous money cycle structure includes one period with a centralized market
followed by two decentralized market periods. ey find that trade is higher in the first of
the decentralized markets, which is due to the hot potato effect. Our model shows that this
effect is present even when money cycles are not imposed exogenously.
Smoothingoutnon-convexitieswithnon-monotonic policies Agents in ourmodel smooth
out the non-convexity of the production cost function by following work-vacation patterns
over time.is allows them to lower their average production cost below the cost of the av-
erage amount of production over the money cycle. However, unlike the models discussed
below, production does not decrease monotonically throughout the money cycle.
ere are three forces influencing agents’ production decisions. First, agents must time
their production so that they can finance their consumption in every period. Second, the
fixed cost of production is minimized when production is concentrated in fewer periods.
ird, the impact of the inflation tax is minimized when money is acquired immediately
before it is spent. Unlike consumption, these forces do not give rise to monotonic produc-
tion over the money cycle. Instead, agents may have several clusters of work days separated
by vacations. roughout the subsequence of production days, the quantity of production

increases over the money cycle. Money holdings increase on work days and decrease on
vacation days. When the marginal cost is constant, agents work once at the start of ev-
ery money cycle, and money holdings decrease monotonically thereaer. However if the
marginal cost is increasing, money holdings need not move monotonically throughout the
money cycle.
Ourmodel can be seen as a general equilibrium version of themodels of Baumol ()
and Tobin (). In these models, agents may pay a fixed cost to liquidate capital into
money. us, the agents face a non-convex cost of acquiring cash. It is optimal for them
to smooth out this cost by liquidating enough capital for several periods, and exhausting
the resulting cash before replenishing. is means both money balances and liquidation
decisions are monotonic. Money cycle equilibria, such as the one illustrated in Figure 
may also have this property. However, if the marginal cost is increasing, money cycles may
be more complicated.
In the model of Rogerson (), agents use lotteries to smooth out non-convexities in
a indivisible labor supply choice and obtain an efficient equilibrium.e agents in Prescott,
Rogerson and Wallenius () and Rogerson and Wallenius () smooth out a non-
convex labor supply choice across time. Since agents have access to credit, the timing of
labor-supply is irrelevant, and the equilibrium is efficient. If agents must settle trades im-
mediately, the production timing becomes a non-trivial choice. Despite this complexity,
our paper shows that under optimal monetary policy, agents may use money to smooth
out non-convexities across time to obtain efficient equilibria.
Non-trivial distribution of money holdings Away from the Friedman rule, each agents’
money holdings proceed through a finite money cycle which forms the support of the dis-
tribution ofmoney holdings. Hence, at any point in time, there is an equalmeasure of agents
at each point of the money cycle, e.g. in the example of Figure  this means that at any point
in time there is one quarter of agents with no money holdings, one quarter of agents with
money holdings at period two of the money cycle, etc. A non-trivial distribution of money
naturally arises when agents either have heterogeneous preferences, or face idiosyncratic
shocks.¹ Our model illustrates that fixed costs may also lead to non-trivial money distribu-
tions.
e paper is organized as follows: Section  presents the environment of ourmodel.e
money cycle equilibria are characterized in Section .e algorithmused for our numerical
examples is presented in Section  and Section  concludes.
¹Bhattacharya, Haslag andMartin () supplies details of how exogenous heterogeneity leads to money
distributions in several models.

 Environment
Weconstruct a stationary general equilibriummodelwith infinite discrete timewhere agents
discount at rate . In each period t, agents may produce any quantity qt  0 of the con-
sumption good at cost c (qt). Agents receive utility u (xt) from consuming xt units of this
good. If an agent produces more than he consumes, he may sell the surplus for fiat money
on a spot market at the price pt.
As is standard in themonetary theory literature, we assume that agents must settle their
transactions immediately. We interpret this as an assumption that agents are anonymous
and have no way to enforce IOU’s or private credit (such as a promise to repay in future).
Let Mt be the aggregate stock of money in nominal terms at the beginning of period t.
We assume that it evolves over time depending on a lump sum transfer Tt issued by the
government to all agents before starting to trade goods. We write 1 + t+1 = Mt+1/Mt,
where  is the money growth rate.
If an agent holdsm units of money at time t and the continuation value of holdingm is
Wt (m), his optimal choices satisfy the Bellman equation
Wt (m) = max
q2R+; x2R+;m02R+
u (x)  c (q) +  Wt+1 (m0)
s.t. pt x+ (1 + t)m
0 = pt q +m+ Tt:
()
We focus on stationary equilibria under stationary monetary policy, so that the real
transfer is stationary with T = Tt/pt and inflation is stationary with  = t. Let Zt =
Mt/pt be the real value of the money stock. SinceMt + Tt = (1 + ) Mt, or in real terms,
Zt+T = (1 + ) Zt, the real money stock is stationary and can be expressed asZ = T/.
When we replace the nominal balances mt with real balances zt = mt/pt, the problem
becomes stationary:
V (z) = max
q2R+; x2R+; z02R+
u (x)  c (q) +  V (z0)
s.t. x+ (1 + ) z0 = q + z + T:
()
Let us assume that the production cost c (q) is strictly increasing, convex, and differen-
tiable, but allow for a discontinuity at q = 0 which represents a fixed cost. We assume that
c (0) = 0. Similarly, we assume that u is strictly increasing, differentiable, and concave and
satisfies the Inada conditions.
We write the optimal production quantity as q (z) and the optimal consumption policy
as x (z). e distribution of real money holdings is F . A symmetric stationary equilibrium
in this environment is a tuple
[x (z) ; q (z) ; F (z) ; T ]

such that
• the policies q (z) and x (z) solve the stationary problem above given T ;
• goods and money markets clear so that supply equals demand:Z
q (z) dF (z) =
Z
x (z) dF (z) and
T

=
Z
z dF (z) ;
• the distribution of money holdings is stationary:
F (z0) =
Z
I f [q (z)  x (z) + z + T ]/ (1 + )  z0g dF (z)
which means that the measure of agents holding less than or equal to z0 real balances
of money at the beginning of the next period has to equal the measure that saved z0
by working, consuming, and getting lump sum transfers.
 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibria. Despite the fact that the value function is not
differentiable, we show that the Euler equation holds when agents have non-zero money
holdings. We establish that away from the Friedman rule, agents’ decisions follow money
cycles in every stationary equilibrium. In a money cycle, agents begin with nomoney hold-
ings, work in the first period, and end the money cycle with no money again. We show that
money can only have value for money cycles of length two or more. In a money cycle equi-
librium, the distribution of money holdings is non-trivial, with a finite support. In money
cycles, agents front-load consumption in response to the inflation tax. We interpret this
as a hot potato effect of inflation. Agents also attempt to back-load production, but this is
limited by the budget constraint and their preference to front-load consumption. In par-
ticular, money cycles begin with a work day and end with a vacation. When agents face a
constant marginal production cost, money cycles have a monotonic Baumol-Tobin struc-
ture with only one work day. However, we provide an example with increasing marginal
cost in which the money holdings are not monotonically decreasing throughout the money
cycle. Finally, we study optimal monetary policy. We show that the Friedman rule is opti-
mal. However, money cycle equilibria typically do not exist at the Friedman rule. Agents
are able to perfectly smooth out the non-convexity from the fixed cost, but this typically
requires a non-repeating work-vacation pattern.

e key equation we would like to establish for characterizing the equilibrium is the
Euler equation
u0 (x) =

1 + 
u0 (x0) : ()
is equation is typically established by applying an envelope theorem. However, the fixed
cost of production creates non-differentiabilities and non-convexities, which preclude the
application of the traditional envelope theorem of Benveniste and Scheinkman () and
also the more recent envelope theorem of Cotter and Park (). We apply our Clausen
and Strub () envelope theorem to obtain the Euler equation without making any such
assumptions. To apply our theorem, we rewrite the Bellman equation as
V (z) = max
z00; q0
f (z; z0; q) +  V (z0)
where
f (z; z0; q) = u [q + z + T   (1 + ) z0]  c (q)
is differentiable in z and z0. Our envelope theorem then implies that when z0 > 0,
 fz0 (z; z0; q) =  V 0 (z0) =  fz (z0; z00; q0) ;
where z00 and q0 are optimal choices at z0. Expanding this equality gives the Euler equation
(). (Note that the Euler equation does not hold when z0 = 0.)
e first-order condition
u0 (x) = c0 (q) ()
applies on work days (when q > 0).
Definition  We say that an agent’s decisions (fqtg ; fxtg ; fztg) follow a money cycle of
length n if n is the smallest number such that zt = zt+n for all t. We say that the money
cycle is non-trivial if n > 1. 2
eorem  In every stationary monetary equilibrium away from the Friedman rule (i.e. for
1 +  > ), agents’ decisions follow a (possibly trivial) money cycle that contains 0. 2
P Suppose (fqt g ; fxtg ; fzt g) is an optimal solution to the agent’s problem.We argue
below that zt includes 0 for some t. By truncating the start of the sequences, we repeat the
argument to conclude that zt includes a second 0. In a stationary equilibrium, the same
decisions are taken both times zt = 0. We conclude that the entire sequence of decisions
between the first and second time zt = 0 are repeated over and over to form amoney cycle.

For the sake of contradiction, suppose that zt > 0 for all t. In this case, the Euler equa-
tion () applies every period so that
u0 (xt ) =


1 + 
n
u0
 
xt+n

: ()
When the money growth rate is above the Friedman rule (i.e. 1 +  > ), the first term on
the right side converges to 0, so u0 (xt ) ! 1 and hence xt ! 0. Similarly, the first-order
condition () that u0 (xt ) = c
0 (qt ) combined with the fact that there is no last work date
(due to market clearing) implies that a subsequence of qt diverges to1 with marginal cost
also diverging to1. We now show these decisions are suboptimal in a stationary monetary
equilibrium, and conclude that zt contains 0. We provide separate proofs for the inflation,
deflation and boundary cases.
Under inflation, T > 0 implies that consuming xt = T every period is feasible (without
relying on savings). When consumption drops below T , an agent would be strictly better of
deviating to consuming T every period.
Under deflation, the transfers T are negative, so they can not be used to fund consump-
tion. But real money holdings z give a real return of z ( ) / (1 + ). When the real bal-
ance z is sufficiently large, the real return will be bigger than the lump sum tax  T , and
the remainder, x (z) can be consumed forever. We already showed that the real balances
raised on work periods approaches1. is means the agent can afford x (zt ) ! 1 units
of consumption forever. erefore xt ! 0 is suboptimal.
Finally, in the boundary case when T = 0 and  = 0, the budget constraint simplifies
to
xt + zt+1 = qt + zt:
is budget constraint allows the agent to perfectly store the consumption good by hold-
ing money. Since production qt increases towards infinity, and consumption x

t decreases
towards , eventually production on work days is larger than consumption. erefore, a
sequence of multiple work days followed by one vacation is suboptimal: the agent should
swap the first work day and the vacation day, so that the production cost is delayed. is
implies that eventually there are no consecutive work days. Moreover, since marginal cost
is unbounded (from the Euler equation and first-order condition), there is a time t where²
c (qt ) > 2 c (q

t /2) :
is cannot be optimal as an agent is strictly better off splitting their production across two
consecutive days (which is feasible because of the budget constraint). 
²To see this, recall a function f is convex if f [x+ (1  ) y]   f (x)+(1  ) f (y). Setting  = 0
and x = 0:5 gives 2 f (y/2) f (0)  f (y). By taking the convex hull of c (q), we arrive at a convex function
f (q) with f (0) = 0 that coincides with c for sufficiently large q.

Note that there may be multiple stationary equilibria. In this case, it would also be an
equilibrium for agents to switch from one money cycle to another. However, such an equi-
librium is not stationary.
e following corollary shows that a trivial money cycle (in which agents always hold
zero real-balances of money) can not be a monetary equilibrium. Rather, trivial money
cycles give rise to autarky.
Corollary  In every trivial money cycle equilibrium (with length one), money has no value.2
P As shown above, every money cycle includes zero. Together with stationarity this
implies that all agents consume what they produce. us the money market clearing con-
dition implies:
Mt
Pt
=
Z
zt dF (mt) = 0
It follows that pt =1 and thus there exists no monetary equilibrium. 
Next, we show that the distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate, but has a
simple structure.is is because agents trade positions with each other in the money cycle.
Corollary  e stationary distribution F of (real balances of) money holdings has equal
mass over a finite set. 2
P e support of the distribution of real balances coincides with the equilibrium se-
quence of real balances. Since each agent cycles through the sequence at the same pace, the
measure of agents at each point of the sequence is equal, so the stationary distribution has
equal mass at each point in its support. 
Without loss of generality, we say that the start of the money cycle is when agents hold
no money. e following theorem summarizes the properties of money cycles.
eorem  In every stationary equilibrium away from the Friedman rule, agents proceed
through money cycles that
(i) have decreasing consumption, with marginal utility increasing in proportion to the in-
flation tax, (1 + ) /.
(ii) aer eliminating vacations have production increasing throughout themoney cycle, with
(shadow) marginal cost increasing in proportion to the inflation tax.
(iii) begin with work and end with vacation. 2

P (i) Previously, we found the Euler equation () holds between period t and t+1
whenever zt+1 > 0. Since z

t+1 is greater than 0 in every period before the end of a
money cycle, the Euler equation holds between every period within a money cycle.
e Euler equation implies consumption decreases with marginal utility increasing
in proportion to (1 + ) /.
(ii) Follows from part (i) and the production first-order condition ().
(iii) Since the agent begins a money cycle with no money, it must work to finance its first
period consumption.
Suppose the agent works in the last period. Since production is greater or equal to
consumption in the first period, parts (i) and (ii) imply that production is strictly
greater than consumption in the last period.is contradicts the conclusion that sav-
ings are 0 in the last period. 
e following corollary shows that when agents face a constant marginal production
cost, a Baumol-Tobin style work-vacation pattern such as the example in Figure  emerges
endogenously.
Corollary  If c (q) is affine away from q = 0, thenmoney cycles contain only one work day.2
P Since c0 (qt) = u0 (xt) on work days, and u0 (xt) increases over the money cycle, it
follows that c0 (qt)must increase on work days. But when c (q) is affine, c0 (q) is a constant.
However, if themarginal cost is strictly increasing,money cycles can becomemore com-
plex. Figure  shows a non-trivial example of a money cycle including the resulting distri-
bution of money holdings. Agents proceed through a money cycle of five time periods with
vacations on the third and final periods. Consumption x is decreasing over themoney cycle
whereas the production quantity q is increasing, conditional on producing.Money holdings
z are non-zero (even at t = 4!) until themoney cycle ends with zeromoney holdings.More-
over, consumption and production are not monotonic in money holdings; i.e. agents with
more money do not work more, and do not consume more. e histogram of real balances
presents a non-degenerate distribution ofmoney holdings. Goods as well asmoneymarkets
clear in each period of the money cycle. Hence, aggregate consumption and production are
stationary over time.
Let us finally examine the case of the Friedman rule. e following theorem shows that
under the Friedman rule, agents can perfectly smooth out the non-convexity of the cost
function. To be precise, we smooth out the agent’s cost function c(q) by defining its convex
hull c(q) as the upper envelope of the set of affine functions that lie below c(q). e convex
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Figure : Equilibriummoney cycle and related histogram of money holdings when u (x) =
x0:3, c (q) = 0:1 + q1:5 for q > 0,  = 0:98 and  = 0:01.
hull is depicted in Figure . We say that an agent can smooth out the non-convexity of c(q)
if it can achieve the same utility under c(q) as if it instead faced c(q). We show below that
this is possible under the Friedman rule. However, smoothing out non-convexities may not
be possible with a money cycle, which requires a rational ratio of work days to vacation
days. erefore, the set of primitives for which money cycles exist at the Friedman rule has
measure zero. is contrasts with eorem  which shows that money cycles exist away
from the Friedman rule.
eorem  Consider the monetary policy at the Friedman rule with 1+  = . Suppose the

convex hull c (q) coincides with c (q) for q  q.³ Let x = q be the efficient symmetric
steady state in the convexified economy. Figure  illustrates c(q), c (q), q and q.
(i) Every equilibrium gives every agent the same value as in the efficient symmetric steady
state of the convexified economy. Hence agents may smooth out non-convexities, and
the Friedman rule is optimal.
(ii) A money cycle equilibrium exists if and only if q/q 2 Q or q > q, 2
P When q  q, the equilibria in the convexified and the fixed cost economies co-
incide, and these results are trivial. For the remainder of the proof, we consider the case
q < q.
(i) e steady state in the convexified economy is efficient and symmetric. is gives
agents a value of [u (x)  c (x)] / (1  ). Now consider the following sequence
in the economywith fixed cost: each agent consumes x and on each production day
produces q. In the long run, the fraction of times each agent works approaches q/q.
(For example, whether an agent works at time t could be determined by whether
the tth digit of the binary expansion of q/q is 1.) Such an allocation is optimal for
all agents since they are indifferent about the timing decision of production at the
Friedman rule. is can be seen from the Euler equation u0 (xt) = u0 (xt+n) and the
first-order condition u0 (xt) = c0 (qt). Since this gives each agent the same value as in
the convexified economy, it is efficient.
(ii) If q/q 2 Q with q/q = a/b, then each agent can work a days and take b   a
days off, which gives rise to a money cycle equilibrium. However, any cycle gives a
rational ratio of work days to vacation days, so the average number of work days can
not approach an irrational number q/q 62 Q. 
 Algorithm
is section describes the algorithm that we use to calculate the examples in Figures  and
.⁴ e algorithm exploits the fact that it is easy to calculate the agent’s optimal plan once
the starting consumption value is known. erefore we use a forward shooting algorithm
³ Note that when c(q) has constant marginal cost, the convex hull c(q) does not intersect with c(q) for
q > 0.
⁴e program code is available on the authors’ websites.
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Figure : e convex hull of the cost function
that searches among possible consumption values at the start of the money cycle.⁵ We then
calculate the equilibrium by searching for the real value of monetary transfers that clears
the market. (is is equivalent to deriving the real value of one unit of money.)
Even though we established that the length of a money cycle is finite, we did not yet
provide a bound for the length of money cycles. is is important, as our algorithm cal-
culates the optimal choices for each candidate money cycle length, and can not consider
an infinite number of candidates. e following theorem provides a bound on the length
of money cycles when there is inflation, and also bounds the possible initial consumption
values x1.
eorem  Consider an equilibrium with inflation so that T > 0.
(i) If the agent holds real balances of z1, then
(a) their consumption x1 lies in [T; x1], where x1 = maxfz1 + T; x^g and x^ solves
u0 (x) = c0 (x  z1   T ).
(b) they spend all of their money within the following number of periods,
log
u0 (x1)
u0 (T )

log

1 + 

:
⁵Forward shooting methods are the topic of Judd (, Chapter ).

(ii) Since money cycles begin with z1 = 0, the length of money cycles is bounded by this
expression at z1 = 0.
P (i) (a) Clearly x1  T . We need to show that x1  maxfz1 + T; x^g. If the
agent does not work in the first period, then x1  z1+T . If the agent works, we
will show thatx1  x^. Intuitively, if an agent consumes a lot, then theymust also
produce a lot; but as diminishing marginal utility and increasing marginal cost
set in, it becomes suboptimal to increase consumption and production. Since
the agent starts with z1 real balances of money, the budget constraint implies
that q1  x1   z1   T . e first-order conditions imply u0 (x1) = c0 (q1).
Moreover, since marginal cost is increasing, c0 (q1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ). us,
u0 (x1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ), or equivalently, x1  x^ since u0 is decreasing and c0
is increasing.
(b) Now suppose that z2; : : : ; zn > 0. We will put an upper bound on n for which
this can be true. Under inflation, xn  T > 0. By the Euler equation,
u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) :
Substituting the bound for x1 above and the bound xn  T into this equation
gives
u0 [maxfz1 + T; x1g]  u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) 


1 + 
n
u0 (T ) ;
which can be rearranged to the bound on n given above.
(ii) Trivial. 
e algorithm takes u, c,  and  as exogenous, and calculates the money cycle length
n, the real value of transfers T and the decisions (xt; qt; zt)
n
t=1.
Algorithm to solve the agent’s problem: Given T > 0, calculate the length of the money
cycle n, and the decisions (xt; qt; zt)
n
t=1.
(i) Calculate bounds on initial consumption x1 and money cycle length n according to
eorem .
(ii) Search in this range for the x1 that maximizes lifetime utility.is utility is calculated
as follows. For each possible money cycle length (within the bounds from above),
calculate the sequence of (xt; qt; zt):

(a) Each xt is calculated using the Euler equation.
(b) Set qt = 0 if zt is enough to finance xt. Otherwise, c0 (qt) = u0 (xt).
(c) Set z1 = 0, and the remaining zt are determined by the budget constraint. (Note:
until we find the best x1, there maybe money le over at the end of the money
cycle.)
(d) e value of this sequence is then 1
1 n
Pn
t=1 
t [u (xt)  c (qt)] :
Algorithm to calculate the money cycle equilibrium: Find the T > 0 such that markets
clear using the bisection algorithm⁶ on the excess demand, which is
Pn
t=1 xt   qt where n,
xt and qt are the optimal decisions calculated in the inner loop.
 Conclusion
We present a simple general equilibrium model with homogeneous agents where money
arises from a fixed cost of production. is leads to a rich equilibrium structure. Agents
avoid the fixed cost by taking vacations. Fiat money then supports the trade of surplus
production between workers and vacationers. Away from the Friedman rule, we show that
agents acquire and spend money in money cycles of finite length. roughout a money
cycle, agents decrease their consumption which we interpret as the hot potato effect of in-
flation. e Friedman rule is optimal and we show that a money cycle may still exist.
Classicalmodels ofmoney are typically based on a competitivemarket with neither cap-
ital nor credit. ey then impose exogenous timing structures, market participation con-
straints, or cash-in-advance constraints to make money essential. Our model provides a
novel reason for fiat money to be essential: a fixed cost of production. e equilibria that
arise in our simple model are similar to other classical money models: the Friedman rule
is optimal, and monetary equilibria Pareto dominate the non-monetary equilibrium. Our
model can be considered a general equilibrium version of the models of Baumol ()
and Tobin (). In their models, a constant marginal cost of liquidation leads the agent
to proceed through a monotonic cycle of liquidating and spending money balances down
to zero. However, in our model, more complex money cycles may arise if the marginal
cost is increasing. We calculate an example where money holdings do not decrease mono-
tonically throughout the money cycle using a forward shooting algorithm. Moreover, our
model yields a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings in the absence of idiosyn-
cratic shocks or any other type of heterogeneity among agents.
⁶e bisection algorithm calculates a root of a continuous function f : [a;A] ! R with f (a) < 0 <
f (A) by successively cutting the domain [a;A] in half around the mid-point (a+A) /2. See Judd (,
page ).

ere are natural extensions of interest. We do not study uncertainties in our frame-
work. Shocks on productivity or on the fixed cost of production will certainly have a lasting
effect on money cycle equilibria. Such uncertainties may also call for alternative, state de-
pendent monetary policy transmission mechanisms to examine further.
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